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Conceptual Representations of Action in the Lateral Temporal Cortex
Abstract
Retrieval of conceptual information from action pictures causes greater activation than from object pictures
bilaterally in human motion areas (MT/MST) and nearby temporal regions. By contrast, retrieval of
conceptual information from action words causes greater activation in left middle and superior temporal gyri,
anterior and dorsal to the MT/MST. We performed two fMRI experiments to replicate and extend these
findings regarding action words. In the first experiment, subjects performed conceptual judgments of action
and object words under conditions that stressed visual semantic information. Under these conditions, action
words again activated posterior temporal regions close to, but not identical with, the MT/MST. In the second
experiment, we included conceptual judgments of manipulable object words in addition to judgments of
action and animal words. Both action and manipulable object judgments caused greater activity than animal
judgments in the posterior middle temporal gyrus. Both of these experiments support the hypothesis that
middle temporal gyrus activation is related to accessing conceptual information about motion attributes,
rather than alternative accounts on the basis of lexical or grammatical factors. Furthermore, these experiments
provide additional support for the notion of a concrete to abstract gradient of motion representations with the
lateral occipitotemporal cortex, extending anterior and dorsal from the MT/MST towards the peri-sylvian
cortex.
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Conceptual Representations of Action in the Lateral
Temporal Cortex
Joseph W. Kable, Irene P. Kan, Ashley Wilson,
Sharon L. Thompson-Schill, and Anjan Chatterjee
Abstract
& Retrieval of conceptual information from action pictures
causes greater activation than from object pictures bilaterally
in human motion areas (MT/MST) and nearby temporal re-
gions. By contrast, retrieval of conceptual information from
action words causes greater activation in left middle and su-
perior temporal gyri, anterior and dorsal to the MT/MST. We
performed two fMRI experiments to replicate and extend these
findings regarding action words. In the first experiment,
subjects performed conceptual judgments of action and object
words under conditions that stressed visual semantic informa-
tion. Under these conditions, action words again activated
posterior temporal regions close to, but not identical with, the
MT/MST. In the second experiment, we included conceptual
judgments of manipulable object words in addition to
judgments of action and animal words. Both action and mani-
pulable object judgments caused greater activity than animal
judgments in the posterior middle temporal gyrus. Both of
these experiments support the hypothesis that middle
temporal gyrus activation is related to accessing conceptual
information about motion attributes, rather than alternative
accounts on the basis of lexical or grammatical factors. Fur-
thermore, these experiments provide additional support for
the notion of a concrete to abstract gradient of motion repre-
sentations with the lateral occipito-temporal cortex, extending
anterior and dorsal from the MT/MST towards the peri-sylvian
cortex. &
INTRODUCTION
A large body of work within cognitive neuroscience has
examined how the brain mediates conceptual knowl-
edge of the world. Starting from the observation that
knowledge of specific categories of objects can be
selectively impaired by brain damage, a range of com-
peting theories have been proposed for the neural
mediation of conceptual knowledge. One class of theo-
ries argues that category-specific deficits do not result
from category-specific organization per se, but rather
because different kinds of information are more relevant
to concepts in different conceptual categories (Gainotti,
2000; Saffran & Schwartz, 1994; Warrington & Shallice,
1984). According to this view, conceptual knowledge
is mediated by distributed neural networks, partially
dissociable according to the kind of information repre-
sented, such as particular sensory or motor attributes.
Variations within this general class of theories have
been elaborated to explain how such conceptual repre-
sentations interact with perceptual or language systems
to allow for category-specific deficits restricted to lan-
guage or perception (Damasio, Tranel, Grabowski,
Adolphs, & Damasio, 2004; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003;
Pulvermuller, 1999). A second class of theories proposes
that category-specific deficits are evidence of category-
specific organization, and that the brain contains do-
main-specific knowledge systems shaped by evolution
and specialized for particular categories of knowledge
(Caramazza & Mahon, 2003). Finally, a third class of
theories also argues that conceptual knowledge is me-
diated by distributed neural networks, but these net-
works are not organized along sensorimotor lines (Tyler
& Moss, 2001; Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, & Romani, 1990).
Rather, category-specific deficits arise because of the
structure of knowledge in different conceptual catego-
ries (intercorrelations vs. uniqueness of semantic fea-
tures), and how such structure breaks down with
damage to a unitary conceptual system.
However, most of the tests pitting these competing
theories have focused on knowledge of different cate-
gories of objects. Comparatively less attention has been
given to what might be considered a broader distinction
between actions and objects. In language, verbs com-
monly represent actions, and nouns commonly repre-
sent objects. Brain damage can independently impair
conceptual knowledge of actions and objects (Daniele,
Giustolisi, Silveri, Colosimo, & Gainotti, 1994; Miceli,
Silveri, Nocentini, & Caramazza, 1988; McCarthy &
Warrington, 1985), and a few functional imaging studies
have found distinct brain areas that are engaged to aUniversity of Pennsylvania
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greater degree by actions or objects (Tranel, Martin,
Damasio, Grabowski, & Hichwa, in press; Kable, Lease-
Spellmeyer, & Chatterjee, 2002; Damasio, Grabowski,
Tranel, Ponto, et al., 2001; Perani, Cappa, et al., 1999;
Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995). An
understanding of the neural substrates of actions, com-
pared to different categories of objects, should provide
important evidence for evaluating theories of concep-
tual knowledge systems, as well as a more complete pic-
ture of the neural mediation of conceptual knowledge.
We directly investigated the neural substrates of ac-
tion knowledge in a previous fMRI study (Kable, Lease-
Spellmeyer, et al., 2002). Subjects saw three pictures or
three words simultaneously, one at the top of the screen
and two at the bottom, and they were asked to deter-
mine which of the two concepts presented at the
bottom was most similar to the one presented at the
top. For example, subjects would decide that ‘‘digging’’
was more similar to ‘‘shoveling’’ than ‘‘listening’’ or that
‘‘doctor’’ was more similar to ‘‘cop’’ than ‘‘zucchini.’’
Subjects performed the same task once with pictures
and once with words. When subjects performed the task
with pictures, there was greater activity for actions,
compared to objects, bilaterally in human motion area
MT/MST and in nearby areas of the middle temporal
gyrus. When subjects performed the task with words,
there was greater activity for actions, compared to
objects, in the left middle and superior temporal gyri,
anterior and dorsal to the activation for pictures. Action
words, unlike action pictures, did not preferentially ac-
tivate area MT/MST.
These results suggest that parts of the lateral occipito-
temporal cortex are particularly important for me-
diating conceptual knowledge of actions. In addition,
considering the involvement of the MT/MST, the senso-
rimotor theory of conceptual knowledge provides the
most natural explanation for these findings. Within this
framework, we argued that the lateral occipito-temporal
cortex likely mediates different representations of mo-
tion, which are presumably more relevant for action
concepts compared to object concepts. Furthermore,
we suggested that these motion representations are or-
ganized on a concrete to abstract gradient, with more
concrete representations preferentially accessed from
pictures located more posteriorly near the MT/MST,
and more abstract representations preferentially ac-
cessed from words located more anteriorly near the
peri-sylvian cortex.
However, there are alternative possible explanations
for our findings concerning action words, especially
given the small overlap between areas showing greater
activation for action words and action pictures. Action
words may have failed to activate area MT/MST be-
cause the judgments for the particular stimuli used did
not stress detailed motion information, and not be-
cause of any intrinsic material specificity. Furthermore,
activation differences in the lateral temporal cortex
may have been due to lexical differences between the
action and object words, rather than the differences in
conceptual category. In particular, all of the action
words were verbs, whereas all of the object words were
nouns, so perhaps grammatical processing accounts for
these activation differences. Although other investiga-
tors have failed to detect significant differences between
verbs and nouns in the lateral temporal cortex (Tyler,
Bright, Fletcher, & Stamatakis, 2004; Tyler, Stamatakis,
et al., 2003; Tyler, Russell, Fadili, & Moss, 2001), this
failure highlights the additional possibility that our pre-
vious findings with action words may have been idio-
syncratic to the particular stimuli or subjects.
We designed two fMRI experiments to test these
alternative hypotheses. Both experiments test the hy-
pothesis that activity for words in the lateral temporal
cortex is driven by semantic differences as we previ-
ously argued. In the first experiment, we designed new
word triads for the conceptual judgment task that
focused subjects’ attention on a more constrained set
of visual attributes (see Figure 1). In our previous study,
because the distractor item on each trial was often
distantly related to the other two items (‘‘listening’’
compared to ‘‘digging’’ and ‘‘shoveling’’), subjects could
have made their judgments with only minimal access to
visual attributes of different actions (unlike ‘‘listening,’’
‘‘digging’’ and ‘‘shoveling’’ involve motion). We de-
signed new stimuli in which all three words were closely
related, to increase the importance of visual attributes in
making the judgment. For example, subjects would judge
that ‘‘skipping’’ is more similar to ‘‘bouncing’’ than
‘‘rolling,’’ as both skipping and bouncing have similar
manners of motion, or they would judge that ‘‘zebra’’ is
more similar to ‘‘horse’’ than ‘‘cow,’’ as both zebras and
horses have similar forms. If activation in the lateral
temporal cortex is associated with accessing semantic
information about actions, then we would expect to
replicate our original finding of greater activation for
action words compared to object words. Furthermore, if
our hypothesis about a gradient of action representa-
tions is correct, we would expect the activation for action
words to be closer to the MT/MST in the current exper-
iment, because these stimuli emphasized visual infor-
mation about actions at a greater level of detail than in
our previous study.
In the second experiment, we again used the concep-
tual judgment task, but with three different categories
of words: actions, animals, and manipulable objects.
Although the words for both animals and manipulable
objects are nouns, manipulable object concepts, more
than animal concepts, rely on information about move-
ment (Damasio, Tranel, et al., 2004; Saffran, Coslett, &
Keener, 2003; Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002; McRae, de Sa, &
Seidenberg, 1997). Unlike animals, most manipulable
objects are strongly associated with a constrained set
of actions. So, if the previously observed activation dif-
ferences between action and object words were driven
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by visual attributes associated with concepts, then both
action and manipulable object words should cause
greater activation than animals in the lateral temporal
cortex. However, if these activation differences were
driven by linguistic differences evoked by grammatical
class, then action words should cause greater activity
than both animal and manipulable object words in the
lateral temporal cortex.
RESULTS
Experiment 1
Behavioral Results
In the scanner, subjects were more accurate on object
judgments compared to action judgments [t(7) = 2.9,
p = .02], and they were faster on object judgments
compared to action judgments [t(7) = 5.1, p = .001]
(see Table 1).
Imaging Results
Lateral temporal cortex. We used a region-of-interest
(ROI) approach to test for activity differences in the
lateral temporal cortex. First, anatomical ROIs were
defined individually in each subject for the superior
temporal, middle temporal, and inferior temporal gyrus.
Then, within each ROI, we averaged the fMRI time series
across all voxels that showed significant activity for the
main effect of conceptual judgments compared to the
baseline condition (see Figure 2). For each averaged
time series, we calculated a measure of the difference in
activity between the action and object conditions, and
then tested whether this difference was significantly
different from zero across subjects for each ROI (a
random effects test, see Methods for details of all
analyses). Because our previous findings for action
words were limited to the left hemisphere and most of
the activity for the main effect was in the left hemi-
sphere, we focused our analyses on left hemisphere
ROIs. Across subjects, activity was consistently greater
for action judgments in the left middle temporal gyrus
[t(7) = 4.0, p = .005] and in the left superior temporal
gyrus [t(7) = 4.1, p = .005]. Activity did not differ
between the conditions in the left inferior temporal
gyrus [t(7) = 0.3, p = .76] (see Figure 3 and Table 2).
Table 1. Behavioral Performance (Mean ± Standard Error) of
Subjects in the fMRI Experiments for Different Task Conditions
Accuracy (%) Reaction Time (msec)
Experiment 1
Actions 87 ± 2 1956 ± 101
Objects 92 ± 1 1802 ± 94
Baseline 98 ± 1 1201 ± 60
Experiment 2
Actions 90 ± 2 1994 ± 86
Manipulable Objects 77 ± 3 1984 ± 101
Animals 81 ± 3 2047 ± 144
Baseline 98 ± 1 1048 ± 63
Figure 1. Schematic of
the experimental paradigm.
Subjects were presented with
18-sec blocks of conceptual
judgments, interspersed
with baseline blocks.
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MT/MST. For each subject, we also defined an ROI for
the MT/MST based on a localizer scan. Because there
was little activity for the main effect in the MT/MST, we
averaged across all ROI voxels in both hemispheres.
Across subjects, there was no consistent difference be-
tween action judgments and object judgments [t(7) =
0.9, p = .39]. This pattern did not change if we consid-
ered only voxels in the left hemisphere.
Figure 2. Example ROIs are shown. The main effect for the conceptual judgment task is displayed for three different subjects in Experiment 2,
with some ROIs for these subjects highlighted on the different views. ROIs were defined in each subject as all voxels significant for the main effect
contrast within a specified anatomical area. Activity in these ROIs across both experiments is displayed in Figures 3 and 5.
Figure 3. Displayed are averaged time series (and standard error) for lateral temporal ROIs in Experiments 1 and 2. Time series were averaged
across all blocks for each subject and then across all subjects for each experiment. Solid line depicts the average; dotted lines show average plus or
minus standard error (calculated across subjects).
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Comparison of peak activity. The ROI analyses rep-
licated our previous findings for action words in the
lateral temporal cortex; however, these analyses might
obscure a shift in activation within an ROI across studies.
In order to look for such a shift, we calculated the loca-
tion of the peak difference between action and object
judgments in the left lateral temporal cortex. Unthresh-
olded t-maps for the actions versus objects contrast
were created for each subject and normalized into MNI
space. The location of the voxel in the lateral occipito-
temporal cortex demonstrating the largest difference
between actions and objects was identified for each
subject, and the average location of this peak was
computed across subjects. For the eight subjects in this
experiment, the mean location (and standard error)
of the peak difference between actions and objects
within the left lateral occipito-temporal cortex was
(55 ± 3, 60 ± 2, 5 ± 4). We performed a similar
analysis for our previous study (Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer,
et al., 2002). For the six subjects in the previous study,
the mean location of the voxel with the largest differ-
ence between actions and objects in the word condi-
tion was (56 ± 3, 26 ± 13, 0 ± 4), whereas the mean
location of the voxel with the largest difference be-
tween actions and objects in the picture condition was
(50 ± 3, 78 ± 3, 3 ± 2) (see Figure 4). The
differences in the anterior–posterior location of the
peak voxel were statistically significant for each com-
parison [pictures and words from the previous study,
t(10) = 4.0, p = .0025; pictures from the previous
study and words from current experiment, t(12) = 4.9,
p = .0004; words from the previous study and current
experiment, t(12) = 3.0, p = .01]. None of the
inferior–superior or medial–lateral differences in peak
location was significant.
Experiment 2
Behavioral Results
Subjects were more accurate on action judgments than
either animal or manipulable object judgments [actions
vs. animals, t(8) = 2.9, p = .02; actions vs. manipulable
objects, t(8) = 2.9, p = .02]. Reaction times did not
differ between the three conceptual conditions (see
Table 1).
Imaging Results
Lateral temporal cortex. We used a similar ROI analysis
as in the first experiment to look for differences between
the three conditions in the left lateral temporal cortex.
In the left superior temporal gyrus, activity for action
judgments was significantly greater than activity for
animal judgments [actions vs. animals, t(8) = 3.1,
p = .02]. Activity for manipulable object judgments
Table 2. Functional MRI Results
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Actions 
Objects
Actions 
Animals
Actions 
Manipulable Objects
Manipulable Objects 
Animals
Lateral Temporal ROIs
Superior Temporal Gyrus 1.64 ± 0.40 0.73 ± 0.24 0.52 ± 0.51 0.21 ± 0.38
Middle Temporal Gyrus 2.14 ± 0.53 1.29 ± 0.45 0.59 ± 0.64 0.70 ± 0.26
Inferior Temporal Gyrus 0.21 ± 0.66 0.78 ± 0.38 1.68 ± 0.56 0.90 ± 0.31
Other ROIs
Lateral Orbital Gyrus 1.08 ± 0.44 0.30 ± 0.27 0.45 ± 0.35 0.15 ± 0.28
Superior Frontal Gyrus 1.38 ± 0.46 1.01 ± 0.31 0.34 ± 0.39 0.67 ± 0.35
Premotor Cortex 1.25 ± 0.54 0.04 ± 0.31 0.69 ± 0.49 0.65 ± 0.31
Motor Cortex 1.27 ± 0.45 0.35 ± 0.36 0.24 ± 0.36 0.59 ± 0.19
Inferior Parietal Cortex 0.75 ± 0.43 0.88 ± 0.31 1.08 ± 0.43 0.20 ± 0.27
Fusiform Gyrus 0.41 ± 0.93 0.29 ± 0.30 1.02 ± 0.33 0.74 ± 0.32
Middle Occipital Gyrus 1.16 ± 0.47 0.60 ± 0.66 0.85 ± 0.53 0.26 ± 0.62
Retrosplenial Cortex 2.05 ± 0.57 1.77 ± 0.55 1.22 ± 0.42 0.55 ± 0.28
Effect sizes are given as mean ± standard error for contrasts between conceptual conditions within each ROI for Experiments 1 and 2. All effect
sizes are from left hemisphere ROIs. Effect sizes that are consistently different from zero across subjects ( p < .05) are in bold.
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was intermediate between the two and not significantly
different from either. In the left middle temporal gyrus,
both action judgments and manipulable object judg-
ments caused significantly greater activity than animal
judgments [actions vs. animals, t(8) = 2.9, p = .02; manip-
ulable objects vs. animals, t(8) = 2.7, p = .03]. In the left
inferior temporal gyrus, activity for manipulable object
judgments was significantly greater than both action
judgments and animal judgments [actions vs. manipula-
ble objects, t(8) = 3.0, p = .02; manipulable objects vs.
animals, t(8) = 2.9, p = .02] (see Figure 3 and Table 2).
Comparison of peak activity. In the same manner as
the first experiment, we calculated the mean location
(and standard error) of the peak difference within the
left lateral occipito-temporal cortex between actions and
animals (56 ± 3, 54 ± 6, 1 ± 4) and between
manipulable objects and animals (53 ± 2, 56 ± 7,
6 ± 4). The location of these two peaks was not
significantly different. However, both peaks were more
anterior than the peak for action pictures in the pre-
vious study [action words and pictures from the previ-
ous study, t(13) = 2.9, p = .01; manipulable object
words and pictures from the previous study, t(13) = 2.3,
p = .04] and more posterior than the peak for action
words in the previous study [action words and words
from the previous study, t(13) = 2.2, p = .049; ma-
nipulable object words and words from the previous
study, t(13) = 2.2, p = .049] (see Figure 4).
Other Left Hemisphere Regions
Although the main focus of our investigation was on
the pattern of activity in the lateral occipito-temporal
cortex, we also looked for activation differences outside
of this region. To have similar sensitivity, we wanted to
use the same ROI approach. In order to identify poten-
tial ROIs, we first performed an exploratory whole-brain
analysis in normalized space on the data from the first
experiment. Because the purpose of the exploratory
analysis was to generate hypotheses, we used a liberal
height threshold of p < .01 (uncorrected) and extent
threshold of 5 voxels. At this threshold, there were eight
clusters with greater activity for actions: seven were in
the lateral temporal cortex and one was near the border
of the ventral premotor and motor cortex (MNI coor-
dinates of peak voxel: 52.5, 7.5, 15). There were also
10 clusters with greater activity for objects: 3 in the
anterior portions of the superior frontal gyrus (7.5,
52.5, 10; 15, 26.25, 40; and 30, 15, 35); 1 in the lateral
orbital gyrus (22.5, 26.25, 20); 2 in the fusiform gyrus
(33.75, 48.75, 35; and 22.5, 45, 25); 1 in middle
occipital gyrus (45, 78.75, 15); 1 in the inferior
parietal cortex (33.75, 86.25, 35); and 2 extending
from the posterior cingulate into the visual cortex
(3.75, 63.75, 0; and 3.75, 75, 10). Based on these
findings, we decided to define additional anatomical
ROIs in each subject in eight left hemisphere regions:
lateral orbital gyrus, premotor cortex, motor cortex,
superior frontal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, inferior parietal
cortex, middle occipital gyrus, and retrosplenial cortex
(see Methods for details on the anatomical criteria for
these ROIs). For each of these new ROIs, we performed
the same analysis as the one used in the lateral temporal
ROIs.
Because the data from first experiment were used in
the exploratory whole-brain analysis, the ROI analyses
Figure 4. Plotted is the
location of the voxel showing
the peak difference within the
lateral occipito-temporal
cortex for each subject in the
present study and a previous
one (Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer,
et al., 2002). Peak voxels are
shown for five contrasts: ac-
tion words minus object words
in judgments with unrelated
distractors (6, n = 6, previous
study), action pictures minus
object pictures (5, n = 6,
previous study), action words
minus object words in
judgments with related
distractors (., n = 8,
Experiment 1), action words
minus animal words in
judgments with related
distractors (&, n = 9,
Experiment 2), and
manipulable object words minus animal words in judgments with related distractors (~, n = 9, Experiment 2). Locations are projected in the
medial–lateral dimension onto a sagittal slice at x = 51. The most posterior peaks appear outside the brain for this projection because their true
location is medial to this slice.
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for these data are not an independent test. However, the
exploratory analysis did not use a corrected significance
threshold, so these ROI analyses do serve to confirm
whether apparent differences in the exploratory analy-
sis are significant. More importantly, the ROI analyses for
the second experiment are independent from the hy-
pothesis-generating whole-brain analysis. Therefore,
consistent results across the two experiments would
provide inferentially sound evidence for activation differ-
ences in an ROI.
In the first experiment, there was greater activity
for action judgments in the left motor cortex [t(7) =
2.8, p = .03], and a trend in the same direction that
missed significance in the left premotor cortex [t(7) =
2.3, p = .055]. The left retrosplenial cortex showed
the opposite pattern, with consistently greater ac-
tivity for object judgments compared to action judg-
ments across subjects [t(7) = 3.6, p = .009]. In
addition, increased activity for object judgments reached
significance in the left superior frontal gyrus [t(7) =
3.0, p = .02], the left orbital gyrus [t(7) = 2.5,
p = .04], and the left middle occipital gyrus [t(7) =
2.5, p = .04]. In the left fusiform and inferior pari-
etal ROIs, we detected no significant differences be-
tween the action and object conditions (see Figure 5
and Table 2).
In the second experiment, these differences were only
replicated in the retrosplenial and superior frontal ROIs,
which again showed greater activity for objects com-
pared to actions. In the left retrosplenial cortex, there
was greater activity for both animal and manipulable
object judgments compared to action judgments [ac-
tions vs. animals, t(8) = 3.2, p = .01; actions vs.
manipulable objects, t(8) = 2.9, p = .02]. In the left
superior frontal gyrus, only animal judgments showed
greater activity than action judgments [actions vs. ani-
mals, t(8) = 3.2, p = .01]. In addition to these two
replications, there was greater activity for manipulable
object judgments compared to animal judgments in the
left motor cortex [manipulable objects vs. animals, t(8) =
3.1, p = .01], and a trend in the same direction in
the left premotor cortex [manipulable objects vs. ani-
mals, t(8) = 2.1, p = .07]. However, action judgments
were not significantly different from either animal or
manipulable object judgments in the left motor and
premotor cortex. We also detected no significant differ-
ences in the lateral orbital or middle occipital ROIs. In
the left fusiform gyrus, manipulable object judgments
showed greater activity than action judgments, and
trended towards greater activity than animal judgments
[actions vs. manipulable objects, t(8) = 3.1, p = .01;
manipulable objects vs. animals, t(8) = 2.3, p = .052].
In the left inferior parietal cortex, activity was greater
for both manipulable objects and animals compared to
actions [actions vs. animals, t(8) = 2.8, p = .02; actions
vs. manipulable objects, t(8) = 2.5, p = .04] (see
Figure 5 and Table 2).
Right Hemisphere Regions
As explained above, we focused our analyses on left
hemisphere ROIs, because our previous findings (and
current hypotheses) concerned the left hemisphere. In
addition, because our stimuli were words, we did not
expect much activity in the right hemisphere a priori.
Indeed, there was much less activity for the concep-
tual judgment task in right hemisphere areas—for ex-
ample, the number of voxels significant for the main
effect in the right middle temporal gyrus was 20% the
number of voxels in the left middle temporal gyrus.
When we used the same approach to define the cor-
responding right hemisphere ROIs to those used above,
there were only a few significant findings across the
two experiments. In the first experiment, there was
greater activity for action words compared to object
words in the right middle temporal gyrus [t(7) = 2.4,
p = .048]. The right middle temporal gyrus showed
a similar trend (greater activity for actions compared
to animals) in the second experiment that did not reach
significance [t(8) = 1.8, p = .10]. Also in the second
experiment, there was greater activity in the right fusi-
form gyrus for tools compared to actions [t(8) = 2.7,
p = .025], and for animals compared to actions [t(8) =
2.9, p = .02].
DISCUSSION
This study continues our investigations of the role of
the lateral temporal cortex in mediating conceptual
knowledge of action. In the first experiment, we
replicated our previous finding that conceptual judg-
ments of action words activate left posterior temporal
regions close to, but not identical with, area MT/MST,
under revised conditions where these judgments
stressed detailed distinctions between visual motion
features. In the second experiment, we extended
these results by demonstrating that judgments of both
action and manipulable object words caused greater
activity than animal judgments in the middle temporal
gyrus. Thus, semantic differences, rather than lexical
or sublexical factors, seem to drive activation in the
middle temporal gyrus. Finally, across both experi-
ments, we found greater activity for object judgments
in two unanticipated regions, the retrosplenial cortex
and the superior frontal gyrus. We start by discussing our
findings on the role of the lateral occipito-temporal
cortex in verbally mediated conceptual knowledge, be-
fore briefly touching on our findings regarding other
regions.
Lateral Occipito-temporal Cortex
In our first experiment, we tested the whether lateral
occipito-temporal cortex would demonstrate greater
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activity for action words than for object words in a task
that stressed detailed distinctions between visual motion
features. Under these conditions, action words elicited
greater activity than object words in the left middle and
superior temporal gyri. Action words, however, did not
activate the MT/MST more than object words. These
results replicate our previous findings that action words
cause greater activity in left-lateralized posterior tempo-
ral regions, but not within the MT/MST (Kable, Lease-
Spellmeyer, et al., 2002). They are also consistent with
our suggestion for a gradient of motion representations
within the lateral occipito-temporal cortex, such that
areas processing verbal descriptors of motion activate
regions close to, but not identical with, areas that
mediate motion perception.
In our second experiment, we extended these find-
ings by including two categories of object words, animals
and manipulable objects. Again, action judgments eli-
cited greater activity than animal judgments in the
middle and superior temporal gyri on the left. Manipu-
lable object judgments caused greater activation than
animal judgments in the middle temporal gyrus, and
greater activation than both action and animal judg-
ments in the inferior temporal gyrus. This pattern of re-
sults supports the argument that semantic factors, rather
than grammatical class, drives activation within the
middle temporal gyrus.
Thus, the results across both experiments support
the hypothesis that middle temporal gyrus activity is as-
sociated with semantic processing. Because activity in
the middle temporal gyrus cuts across grammatical
category boundaries, these findings are more consistent
with theories that conceptual knowledge is mediated
by a distributed network partially organized according
to sensorimotor attributes, rather than theories positing
conceptual organization along strict category lines. In-
deed, our neural data show a similar pattern to one
demonstrated in recent computational models of fea-
Figure 5. Displayed are averaged time series (and standard error) for other ROIs showing consistent effects in Experiments 1 and 2. Time series
were averaged across all blocks for each subject and then across all subjects for each experiment. Solid line depicts the average; dotted lines show
average plus or minus standard error (calculated across subjects).
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ture-based semantic networks, where the clusters of
conceptual similar items in self-organizing maps cross
grammatical category boundaries (Vinson & Vigliocco,
2002). Within such a feature-based network, the middle
temporal gyrus may be particularly involved in the
semantic processing of motion information, which
would play a central role in conceptual representations
of actions and manipulable objects.
A range of previous findings are consistent with these
suggestions about the role of the middle temporal
gyrus. In a set of studies similar to ours, Tyler and col-
leagues found greater activity in the lateral temporal
cortex for judgments about biological actions compared
to animal judgments (Tyler, Stamatakis, et al., 2003), but
not for all verb judgments compared to all noun judg-
ments (a category that included manipulable objects)
(Tyler, Stamatakis, et al., 2003; Tyler, Russell, et al.,
2001). The lateral temporal cortex also demonstrates
greater activity when subjects generate action words
compared to color words (Martin et al., 1995). Further-
more, damage in this area is associated with impair-
ments on tests of conceptual knowledge for actions
(Tranel, Kemmerer, Adolphs, Damasio, & Damasio,
2003). In addition, activity in this region is found in a
variety of tasks for tool words compared to animal words
(Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Perani, Schnur, et al.,
1999; Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D’Esposito, & Farah,
1999; Cappa, Perani, Schnur, Tettamanti, & Fazio,
1998), and damage in this area is associated with both
impaired knowledge and impaired naming of tool pic-
tures (Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1997; Damasio,
Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwa, & Damasio, 1996). Few pre-
vious studies, however, have directly compared actions
and manipulable objects. Thus, our finding that action
and manipulable object judgments cause distinct acti-
vations in the temporal cortex, which overlap in the
middle temporal gyrus, provides important new evi-
dence concerning the role of the lateral temporal cortex
in conceptual processing.
Interpretation of the distinct areas of activity for
actions and manipulable objects is less clear. One pos-
sibility is that these two categories are associated with
diverging motion features—action words may more
strongly evoke articulated, biological motion, whereas
manipulable objects may more strongly evoke unarticu-
lated, nonbiological motion. Consistent with this idea,
Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby, and Martin (2002, 2003) direct-
ly compared pictures of moving tools with moving
bodies and found greater activation for moving bodies
in the superior temporal sulcus and greater activation
for moving tools in the inferior temporal sulcus. Tranel,
Martin, et al. (in press) found a similar overall pattern in
the lateral temporal cortex for naming of actions and
tools, with activation for actions more dorsal and tools
more ventral. Our current results with words follow this
same dorsal–ventral pattern. However, we cannot rule
out possible alternative explanations. In particular, ac-
tivity in the superior temporal gyrus may be based on
lexical or sublexical factors, such as word length or
grammatical class, especially considering the proximity
of this activity to areas of the supramarginal gyrus im-
plicated in phonological processing.
In the first experiment, we confirmed that activation
for action words encompassed the posterolateral tem-
poral cortex, but not the human MT/MST. In contrast,
previous experiments with pictures have found greater
activation for action pictures compared to object pic-
tures that extends more posteriorly and includes the
MT/MST (Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer, et al., 2002; Damasio,
Grabowski, Tranel, Ponto, et al., 2001; Peigneux et al.,
2000). Furthermore, Martin et al. (1995) observed a
similar anterior shift for words compared to pictures in
a verb generation task. These anterior–posterior differ-
ences between words and pictures could be evidence
of a gradient of motion information represented in the
occipito-temporal cortex, with areas closer to the MT/
MST representing more concrete visual information and
areas closer to the middle temporal gyrus representing
more abstract propositional information. Consistent
with this proposal, the peak of greater activation for
action (and manipulable object) words in the present
two experiments was posterior to the peak of greater
activation for action words in our previous study. Be-
cause the current task used related distractors to
focus subjects’ attention on the type of motion in-
volved in different actions, subjects in the current
study may have recruited comparatively more con-
crete visual information to perform the task. Further-
more, given this posterior shift, we would predict that
there would be a greater overlap between the areas
activated by action words and action pictures in the
conceptual judgment task with related distractors,
compared to the little overlap we observed previously
with unrelated distractors (Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer,
et al., 2002), as the related distractor task constrains
subjects to use similar kinds of semantic information
with both formats.
In both experiments, the difference between action
(or manipulable object) and animal words in the mid-
dle temporal gyrus was smaller than the difference
between any of the conceptual conditions and the per-
ceptual baseline. As can be seen in Figure 3, there was
activation in the lateral temporal cortex for the animal
judgments compared to the perceptual baseline task.
However, interpreting this activation, or any activation
referenced to the baseline, is difficult because the per-
ceptual baseline task was not intended to be a pre-
cise control for the conceptual judgment task (see
Methods). Thus, much of the difference between ani-
mal judgments and the baseline perceptual matching
task may be explained by nonspecific factors such as
attention or task difficulty. That is not to say that
knowledge of animals might not be informed by motion
attributes. Rather, our claim is that motion attributes
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make a relatively greater contribution to action and
manipulable object knowledge compared to animal
knowledge.
Other Regions
Left Frontal Cortex
In the first experiment, activity in the left motor cortex
was consistently greater for action judgments compared
to object judgments. In the second experiment, we did
not replicate this effect in the left motor cortex, al-
though we did find greater activity for manipulable
object judgments compared to animal judgments. We
also failed to find differences in motor or premotor
areas between action and object judgments in our pre-
vious study. This pattern of results provides weak sup-
port for the idea that motor and premotor areas are
important for conceptual representations of action.
In contrast to our results, many previous studies have
found an association between action-naming difficulties
and left frontal damage (Hillis, Tuffiash, Wityk, & Barker,
2002; Tranel, Adolphs, Damasio, & Damasio, 2001;
Daniele et al., 1994; Damasio & Tranel, 1993), or in-
creased activity in the left frontal cortex for tool naming
compared to animal naming (Chao & Martin, 2000;
Grabowski, Damasio, & Damasio, 1998; Grafton, Fadiga,
Arbib, & Rizzolatti, 1997; Perani, Cappa, Bettinardi, et al.,
1995). However, these findings could be explained by
processes other than action semantics that have been
associated with the left frontal cortex. For example, the
left frontal cortex has been associated with the mor-
phological processing of verbs (Tyler, Bright, et al., 2004;
Shapiro & Caramazza, 2003), which could explain action-
naming deficits. Differences in naming associated with
the left frontal cortex could also be due to more gen-
eral processes, such as selection from semantic memory
(Thompson-Schill, 2003; Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito,
& Kan, 1999; Thompson-Schill, Swick, et al., 1998;
Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997),
that might be particularly stressed for certain catego-
ries of stimuli. Alternatively, the left frontal cortex may
participate in representations of motor programs asso-
ciated with different concepts (Hauk, Johnsrude, &
Pulvermuller, 2004; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson,
2003; Kraut, Moo, Segal, & Hart, 2002; Mecklinger,
Gruenewald, Besson, Magnie, & Von Cramon, 2002;
Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001), but these motor
attributes may play a less central role than sensory
ones in the representation of action concepts gener-
ally, or at least for the specific stimuli we used. In
addition, these different processes may explain effects
in different parts of the left frontal cortex. Along these
lines, we recently found a dissociation between activ-
ity during naming in the left ventral premotor cortex,
which was associated with manipulability, and in the
left inferior frontal gyrus, which was associated with se-
lection demands (Kan, Kable, van Scoyoc, Chatterjee, &
Thompson-Schill, in press).
Ventral Occipito-temporal Cortex
If the lateral occipito-temporal cortex plays an impor-
tant role in action representations, then one might
expect the ventral occipito-temporal cortex to play a
similar role in object representations. Consistent with
this notion, we found greater activation for manipula-
ble objects compared to actions in inferior temporal and
fusiform areas. However, we only found greater activa-
tion for animal judgments compared to actions in the
right fusiform in the second experiment. In both the
first experiment and a previous study, we failed to find
greater activation for animal judgments in ventral occi-
pito-temporal areas. One explanation for these incon-
sistent findings may be that action concepts cannot be
accessed independently of the actors or objects involved
in the action. Consequently, one would predict that
object-specific areas in the ventral occipito-temporal
cortex would not respond differentially depending on
whether the object was participating in an action. This
was exactly the pattern reported in a recent experiment
by Beauchamp et al. (2002). Ventral occipito-temporal
areas showed object-specific responses, but these re-
sponses were not modulated by whether the object
was moving, whereas lateral occipito-temporal areas
showed greater responses for moving compared to sta-
tionary stimuli.
Retrosplenial Cortex
Across both experiments, we found consistently greater
activity for object words in two unanticipated regions,
one of which was the left retrosplenial cortex. In the
second experiment, left retrosplenial activity was greater
for both animals and manipulable objects compared to
actions. The retrosplenial cortex has previously been
associated with episodic memory processing. Damage to
the retrosplenial cortex is associated with memory def-
icits (Valenstein et al., 1987), and damage to the left
retrosplenial cortex is associated with verbal memory
deficits (McDonald, Crosson, Valenstein, & Bowers,
2001). In addition, functional imaging studies find retro-
splenial activation associated with episodic encoding
(Shallice et al., 1994). In both experiments of the cur-
rent study, the object words were more concrete than
the action words, and concrete words are better remem-
bered than abstract words. Thus, one possible interpre-
tation of our results is that left retrosplenial activity is
related to encoding words into episodic memory, a
process unrelated to performing the conceptual judg-
ment task. Consistent with this explanation, subjects
performing the same conceptual judgment tasks used
in the two current experiments remember more object
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words from the task than action words in a free recall
paradigm (data not shown).
Superior Frontal Cortex
The superior frontal cortex was the second unantici-
pated region showing greater activity for objects com-
pared to actions. In the second experiment, the superior
frontal cortex showed greater activity only for animals
compared to actions. Previously, activity was found in
portions of the anterior superior frontal gyrus during
a lexical decision task, as well as during other tasks
thought to involve accessing word meaning (Binder
et al., 2003). A nearby region of the superior frontal
gyrus shows greater activity during naming of unique
persons (Damasio, Tranel, et al., 2004) or judgments
about persons (Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002).
Given this pattern of results, the anterior superior
frontal cortex might be involved in conceptual repre-
sentations of animate objects.
Conclusion
Accessing knowledge of actions and manipulable ob-
jects causes distinct activations in the posterior lateral
temporal cortex, which overlap in the middle temporal
gyrus. These findings are compatible with the general
view that conceptual knowledge is instantiated by dis-
tributed neural regions partially organized along sen-
sorimotor lines. Specifically, these data support the
idea that the lateral temporal cortex is important in me-
diating representations of motion features central to
action concepts. Furthermore, we suggest that different
motion representations are organized along a concrete
to abstract gradient, which extends from the occipito-
temporal junction into the middle temporal gyrus and
peri-sylvian cortices.
METHODS
Subjects
Eight right-handed individuals participated in the first
experiment (4 women, 4 men, mean age = 23 years). A
ninth subject was excluded from the study because of
excessive head movement in the scanner (>2 mm across
the scanning session). Nine right-handed individuals
participated in the second experiment (5 women,
4 men, mean age = 21 years). Given that sex dif-
ferences have previously been reported during lan-
guage tasks (Grabowski, Damasio, Eichhorn, & Tranel,
2003), we tried to balance the number of men and
women in each experiment. All subjects were recruited
from the university community, and all spoke only
English before school age. None had a history of
neurologic or psychiatric symptoms. All subjects gave
informed consent in accordance with the procedures
of the Institutional Review Board of the University of
Pennsylvania.
Behavioral Tasks
In both experiments, subjects performed a conceptual
similarity judgment task with words during scanning
(see Figure 1). In each trial, subjects were presented
with three words, one at the top of the screen and two
at the bottom. Subjects pressed a button (right or left
hand) to indicate which of the two words at the bottom
was more closely related in meaning to the word at the
top. In baseline trials, subjects were presented with
three false font strings, and they indicated which of
the two at the bottom of the screen was the same as
the one on top.
The stimuli from the first experiment consisted of
40 action word triads and 40 object word triads. All three
words in a triad referred to actions or objects from the
same general category. Action categories included man-
ners of motion, paths of motion, and movements of dif-
ferent body parts. Object categories were restricted to
animals, fruits and vegetables, trees, flowers, and food.
The stimuli for the second experiment consisted of
32 action word triads, 32 animal word triads, and
32 manipulable object word triads. Manipulable objects
included the categories of tools, kitchen utensils, clean-
ing implements, office implements, and weapons. Be-
cause the second experiment was partially designed
to test the effect of grammatical category, words that
could refer to both a tool and the use of that tool (e.g.,
‘‘hammer’’) were not used in either the action or
manipulable object categories. Given that English words
can frequently be used as both nouns and verbs, it
would have been impossible to exclude all noun–verb
homonyms. However, the context of comparing three
related words, as well as the consistent ending of action
words, served to constrain subjects’ interpretations of
words as denoting objects or actions.
Because in all cases the three words in a triad were
from the same category, they tended to share several
semantic attributes, and the choice was usually distin-
guished on the basis of one salient feature. Using three
words from the same category also reduced the impor-
tance of syntactic information in making judgments
about action words. Although the syntactic frames of
a verb constrains verb meaning, this information best
distinguishes different categories of actions (Fisher,
Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1991). For example, motion verbs
like ‘‘walk’’ and ‘‘slide’’ can both occur in sentences
with one noun argument and a prepositional phrase,
whereas cognition verbs like ‘‘think’’ and ‘‘believe’’ can
both occur in sentences with one noun argument and
a sentential complement.
Triads were selected from a larger initial set on the
basis of pilot testing so that response agreement (the
proportion of subjects choosing a particular response)
Kable et al. 1865
and reaction time were similar across conditions. We
tested 11 pilot subjects for the first experiment (9
women, 2 men, mean age = 27 years) and 12 pilot
subjects for the second experiment (5 women, 7 men,
mean age = 19 years). Equal numbers of left and right
responses were chosen in each condition. No triads
were repeated, although individual words could be re-
peated once. Because many English words can refer to
actions or objects, all action words were presented in
the present participle form, ending in ‘‘-ing.’’ Although
this consistent ending might have created a potential
confound (by making action words longer, for exam-
ple), we felt it was necessary to ensure that subjects un-
derstood the words as clearly referring to actions.
Baseline trials were created by replacing one of the
choice words with the top word and changing all three
words to strings in Wingdings font.
We validated these tasks in a second pilot study
with 24 right-handed subjects (20 women, 4 men, mean
age = 21 years). Twelve subjects performed the con-
ceptual similarity judgment task from the first experi-
ment, and 12 performed the task from the second
experiment. In addition, because eye movements can
cause differences in neural activity (Barton et al., 1996),
we recorded eye position using an iView RED-II cam-
era system (Sensomotoric Instruments, Boston, MA,
www.smi.de) to verify that eye movements did not
systematically differ across conditions. For each con-
dition, we measured subjects’ accuracy, reaction time,
and number of fixations. Fixations, an index of the
amount of eye movements, were defined as gaze po-
sition remaining with a restricted area (radius less
than approximately 2 mm) for greater than 100 msec.
These data are reported in Table 3. There were no
differences across conditions in reaction time or num-
ber of fixations.
In evaluating subjects, we consider a response correct
if it was the one chosen by the majority of pilot subjects.
In this context, subjects could make an ‘‘incorrect’’
choice for valid reasons, based on a semantic property
that choice shares with the target. For our purposes, it
was only important that subjects engaged in the task
and accessed semantic information in making their
judgment, which seemed likely given their 90% accu-
racies in each condition.
We decided to choose stimuli on the basis of reaction
time, rather than on various lexical variables. Values of
these different variables are provided in Table 4. We
prioritized reaction time because it could clearly have an
effect on neural activity, as the fMR response is sensitive
to the length as well as amount of neural activity. As
already mentioned, action words were longer because
of the morphological ending, and verbs are systemati-
cally rated lower in concreteness and imageability. Pre-
vious investigators have noted this confounding of
conceptual categories with lexical variables, and argued
that matching can result in idiosyncratic stimulus sets
(Tranel, Adolphs, et al., 2001). However, we are sensi-
tive to the possibility that these variables may affect
activation, which forms part of the motivation for testing
multiple categories in the second experiment. Because
the manipulable object words are similar to animals in
length, concreteness, and imageability, activation for
both actions and manipulable objects rules out these
potential confounding explanations.
In the first experiment, subjects also participated in
a scan to functionally localize the MT/MST. In this scan,
subjects passively viewed alternating 16-sec blocks of
radially moving rings and stationary rings. The radially
moving rings alternated between inward and outward
motion every 2 sec.
Stimulus Presentation
Stimuli were presented to the subjects using a high-
resolution, fiber-optic presentation system carrying in-
formation from an external computer to goggles attached
to the head coil (Avotec, Stuart, FL, www.avotec.org).
Timing of stimulus presentation was synchronized with
the scanner, so that a new stimulus was always pre-
sented at the beginning of a repetition. Subject responses
were transmitted from the scanner room using a custom-
designed, fiber-optic, motor response-recording device
(Current Design Concepts, Philadelphia, PA). Stimulus
presentation and recording of responses were con-
trolled by Psyscope software (psyscope.psy.cmu.edu)
for the conceptual tasks and Pixx software (psychology.
concordia.ca/department/CVLab/CVLab.html) for the vi-
sual motion scan.
MRI Acquisition
BOLD-sensitive, T2*-weighted fMRI data were acquired
on a 1.5-T GE Signa scanner using a gradient-echo, echo-
planar pulse sequence (TR = 2000 msec, TEeff =
Table 3. Results (Mean ± Standard Error) of Pilot Study for
Stimuli Used in Experiments 1 and 2
Total
Fixations
Accuracy
(%)
Reaction Time
(msec)
Experiment 1
Actions 8.46 ± 0.36 93 ± 1 1710 ± 77
Objects 8.35 ± 0.44 92 ± 1 1702 ± 73
Experiment 2
Actions 8.03 ± 0.21 90 ± 2 1907 ± 72
Manipulable Objects 7.88 ± 0.22 84 ± 2 1984 ± 78
Animals 7.79 ± 0.21 88 ± 2 1913 ± 80
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50 msec, flip angle = 908). The scanner was equipped
with a standard clinical quadrature radio-frequency
head coil and a prototype gradient system (GESR230)
capable of ultrafast imaging. Data were acquired in
twenty-one 5-mm axial slices, covering the entire cortex
but omitting lower portions of the cerebellum and
brainstem. The resolution within each slice was 3.75 
3.75 mm (64  64 matrix within a 24-cm field of
view). Phase maps were acquired to correct for distor-
tion in the echo-planar images. Head motion was min-
imized using foam padding. Subjects performed no task
during the first 20 sec of each scan as steady-state
magnetization was achieved. Subjects in the first exper-
iment completed two 6-min 20-sec scans while per-
forming the conceptual judgment task, for a total of
360 observations per voxel per subject. Subjects in the
second experiment completed two 7-min 32-sec scans
while performing the conceptual judgment task, for a
total of 432 observations per voxel per subject. For each
subject, high-resolution, T1-weighted axial and sagittal
scans were also acquired using a spin-echo sequence
(TR = 500 msec, TE = 8 msec, flip angle = 908).
Data Analysis
Statistical Tests
Data processing was performed off-line using soft-
ware developed at the University of Pennsylvania
(www.voxbo.org). After reconstructing images from
the raw data, data were sinc-interpolated in time to cor-
rect for staggered slice acquisition, realigned to the first
image acquired for each subject using a six-parameter
motion-correction algorithm, and thresholded to ex-
clude extra-parenchymal voxels from subsequent ana-
lyses. Within each subject, a voxelwise analysis was
performed using a version of the modified general linear
model. Included in this model were covariates modeling
different task conditions (e.g., ‘‘action judgments’’), a
subject-specific estimate of the intrinsic temporal auto-
correlation, and sine and cosine regressors for frequen-
cies below those of the task and for frequencies in the
elevated range of the noise spectrum. Task covariates
were boxcar waveforms convolved with an estimate of
the BOLD hemodynamic transfer function empirically
derived from the motor cortex in a large group of
subjects (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D’Esposito, 1998). To
improve specificity, data were also smoothed in time
with the hemodynamic transfer function. These meth-
ods have been empirically demonstrated to control
the false-positive rate (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D’Esposito,
1997; Zarahn, Aguirre, & D’Esposito, 1997).
In the first experiment, reaction times for our two
conditions of interest differed for the subjects partici-
pating in the fMRI experiment, even though they did not
in our pilot testing. Because reaction time differences
alone could account for activation differences, we also
included in our statistical model regressors that covaried
out effects of reaction time differences (Kable, Kimberg,
& Chatterjee, 2004). Using individual subject reaction
times for each trial, we modeled effects of reaction time
for the conceptual task (collapsed across action and
object conditions) using orthogonal polynomial covari-
ates (orthogonalized with respect to the main effect of
the conceptual task) (Buchel, Holmes, Rees, & Friston,
1998). Because reaction times were longer for action
judgments than for object judgments, covarying for
reaction time reduces the amount of activation for
actions (and increases the amount for objects) in the
direct contrast between these conditions.
We tested hypotheses about activity differences be-
tween conditions using an ROI approach. After defining
ROIs, we performed a random-effects group analysis as
follows. Initially, voxels were identified within each
subject where activity was significant for the main effect
of conceptual judgment compared to baseline condi-
tions ( p < .05, Bonferroni-corrected for multiple com-
parisons within an ROI). Unlike in cognitive subtraction
Table 4. Values of Psycholinguistic Variables for the Words Used in Each Condition
Letter Length Syllable Length Log Frequency Familiarity Concreteness Imageability
Experiment 1
Actions 7.8 ± 0.1 (120) 2.1 ± 0.03 (120) 1.12 ± 0.06 (108) 529 ± 6 (69) 487 ± 10 (64) 513 ± 8 (68)
Objects 5.5 ± 0.2 (120) 1.7 ± 0.1 (120) 0.88 ± 0.06 (86) 509 ± 6 (82) 602 ± 3 (82) 593 ± 4 (82)
Experiment 2
Actions 7.8 ± 0.1 (96) 2.1 ± 0.03 (96) 0.99 ± 0.07 (81) 506 ± 9 (55) 478 ± 9 (52) 509 ± 7 (53)
Manipulable Objects 5.6 ± 0.2 (96) 1.6 ± 0.1 (96) 0.97 ± 0.08 (67) 505 ± 8 (70) 579 ± 6 (61) 563 ± 6 (61)
Animals 5.8 ± 0.2 (96) 1.8 ± 0.1 (96) 0.70 ± 0.07 (61) 476 ± 9 (64) 608 ± 3 (58) 595 ± 5 (58)
Values are from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database, and are reported as mean ± standard error. Numbers in parentheses are the number of
words for which that variable was listed in the database.
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paradigms, the baseline condition was not designed to
be closely matched to the conditions of interest. Rather,
the main effect comparison simply reduced the number
of voxels within which specific hypotheses about differ-
ential activity for the contrasts of interest were tested.
The fMRI time series was averaged for all voxels signif-
icant for the main effect within a defined ROI in each
subject. Next, a measure of the effect size for the or-
thogonal contrast between conditions of interest (e.g.,
actions minus objects in the first experiment or actions
minus animals in the second experiment) was extracted
from the spatially averaged ROI time series in each
subject. We used t values as a measure of effect size
rather than percent signal change, because the residual
error term in the denominator of the t value most
effectively corrects the effect size for scaling effects
due to differences in overall MR signal intensity across
scanning sessions (Postle, Zarahn, & D’Esposito, 2000).
Finally, paired t tests addressed whether this effect
was consistently greater for one condition or the other
in that ROI across subjects. This analysis gains sensi-
tivity by reducing the effect size in each ROI to one
value and avoiding the need to correct for multiple
comparisons across voxels, although it loses spatial
resolution by averaging across all active voxels within
an ROI.
We performed an additional analysis to compare the
results from this study to those of our previous study.
In particular, a shift in the location of activation within
the lateral occipito-temporal cortex between the two
studies might not be revealed by our ROI analyses. In
order to look for such a shift, we derived unthresh-
olded t-maps for the direct contrast of actions and
objects in each subject. These t-maps were then nor-
malized into the standard coordinate space of the MNI
brain using a 12-parameter affine transformation with
nonlinear deformations. Normalization parameters were
initially calculated using each subject’s high-resolution
anatomical scan. After normalization, the maps were
spatially smoothed with a kernel with full-width half-
maximum of 7.5 mm. We found the location of the
voxel with the peak difference between actions and
objects in the lateral occipito-temporal cortex in each
subject, and computed the average location in MNI
coordinates of this peak across subjects. We performed
a similar analysis on the data from our previous study,
and used t tests to compare the location of the peak
difference in this study to the location of the peak
differences (for both words and pictures) in our previ-
ous study.
We also used the normalized unthresholded t-maps
from the first experiment in a hypothesis-generating
whole-brain analysis. Specifically, we performed a ran-
dom-effects analysis at each voxel by testing whether
the difference between actions and object was signifi-
cantly different from zero across subjects. Because
this analysis was exploratory, we thresholded the results
at a height threshold of p < .01 and an extent threshold
of 5 voxels.
Definition of ROIs
The locations of anatomical ROIs were determined
with reference to a combined MRI/anatomical atlas.
Anatomical ROIs were traced on each subject’s high-
resolution, T1-weighted image by one author and
checked by a second author. The lateral orbital ROI
included the lateral orbital gyrus, inferior to the infe-
rior frontal ROI. The lateral premotor ROI corresponded
to Brodmann’s area 6 laterally, including the cortex
surrounding the precentral sulcus below the superior
frontal gyrus. The motor ROI included the precentral
gyrus, excluding any areas in the premotor ROI. The
superior frontal ROI included the anterior half of the
superior frontal gyrus. The fusiform ROI included both
the occipital and temporal portions of this gyrus. The
inferior, middle, and superior temporal ROIs included
the posterior two-thirds of these gyri. The inferior
parietal ROI included the angular and supramarginal
gyri, corresponding to Brodmann’s areas 39 and 40.
The middle occipital ROI included all of the middle
occipital gyrus. The retrosplenial ROI included portions
of the posterior cingulate cortex immediately surround-
ing the splenium.
For the first experiment, the MT/MST ROI was
functionally identified in each subject in a separate lo-
calizer scan. In accordance with previous studies, we
defined the visual motion cortex on the basis of the
contrast between moving rings and stationary rings. We
included in the MT/MST all significant voxels contigu-
ous with the peak activation on the lateral occipital
surface. This region appears to be the human homo-
logue of motion-sensitive cortical areas in the macaque,
including the MT and MST (Tootell et al., 1995; Watson
et al., 1993). Within this group of subjects, both the
size of the MT/MST (20 voxels/hemisphere) and its
location (within a sulcus near the junction of the in-
ferior temporal sulcus and the ascending limb of the
inferior temporal sulcus) were consistent with previous
studies (Dumoulin et al., 2000).
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